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Introduction
Outsourcing is a co-operative activity undertaken to improve inter-firm transactions and is 'a decision taken by an organisation to contract-out or sell the organisation's IT assets, people and/or activities' ( Willcocks and Kern, 1998: 29 ) to external vendors, who then manage the services for an agreed fee ( Barthelemy, 2003 , Dibbern et al., 2004 , Lacity and Willcocks, 1998 . It has been argued that the broad aim for organisations outsourcing internal functions is to achieve benefits in cost, flexibility and access to resources. However, actual outcomes have been mixed with some outsourcing contracts achieving poor results with a gap between expectations and actual service performance emerging ( Deloittes, 2008 , Wu et al., 2013 .
Outsourcing is a prevalent practice and over 80% of organizations will outsource at least one service ( Corbett, 2004 ) . However, despite this widespread adoption there are performance issues, dissatisfaction and an apparent dichotomy as to why outsourcing is so prevalent, yet lacks empirical justification, and remains a largely unexplored puzzle ( Jiang et al., 2006 , Rouse, 2007 . In this regard, outsourcing as a process, shares similar sub-optimal outcomes with other large scale changes, inter alias: Business Process Engineering ( Holland and Kumar, 1995 ) , Merger and Acquisitions ( Cartwright and Cooper, 1993 ) , the chronic problems of ERP implementations ( Scarbrough et al., 2008 ) and even major failings in large scale project implementations ( Bronte-Stewart, 2009 ) . A recent survey of outsourcing illustrated that 65% of buyers renegotiated their contract, 30% cancelled and switched suppliers and 5% back-sourced the service in-house ( Cullen et al., 2014: 51 ) . These failings do not appear to derive from poor decision making per se but from internal factors, including poor professionalism and communication ( Deloittes, 2008 ) , lack of performance management systems and processes ( McIvor et al., 2009 ) , or possibly an attachment to implementation practices that 'lack any scientific justification' ( Dietz, 2011: 2 ) . Cullen et al. (2005 ) suggested that anecdotal stories of failure may be a consequence of too high a level of analysis, and failure to consider the configuration of the outsourcing relationship. However, when proposing the configuration or governance as key factors researchers and practitioners often remain firmly focused on instrumental and technical matters and check lists (see Oshri et al., 2009 , Willcocks et al., 2006 . In addition, although this focus on configuration is a useful recipe, close collaborative relationships are much more important preconditions for success, and good communication and coordination underpin successful outcomes ( Vanpoucke and Veereke, 2010 , Whitley and Willcocks, 2011 ).
Research into outsourcing has shown mixed results with some researchers arguing that balance sheets of the advantages and disadvantages, or the development of prescriptions, do not allow any kind of conclusion to be drawn in a specific situation ( Clark et al., 1995 ) . Where outcomes are reported most consist of predictions or are desires to reduce cost ( Lacity et al., 2010 ) , are derived from expectations, and not on any grounded analysis ( Rouse, 2007 ) . Alsudairi and Dwivedi (2010 ) , in reviewing the outsourcing literature showed the dearth of research into environmental/contextual issues, whilst Busi and McIvor (2008 ) observed that there are key gaps in understanding and a need for more action research, processual and longitudinal studies focused on those processes and implementation practices underpinning success. The research reported in this paper focuses specifically on the implementation of outsourcing and the role power has in shaping collaboration and action. It is proposed that power and conflict emerges when there is uncertainty in demand or differences in objectives between the parties and that strong governance, rather than alleviating issues, can accentuate problems and inhibit the success of an outsourcing project.
Conflict in outsourcing implementation
It has been argued that organisations can be regarded as coalitions of interest groups competing and conflicting in micro political processes in ways that may be at odds with the overarching organisational goals ( Marshall et al., 2015 , Morgan, 1997 , Quinn, 1980 . From such a perspective it is assumed 'that power and politics are facts of life in organizations' ( Ferris and Judge, 1991: 449 ) and organisations can be regarded as intrinsically political where managers have to manage 'politically diverse and conflicting interests' ( Morgan, 1997: 154 ) . What is implied by this is that diverse groups within organisations can seek to alter major change programmes, to support their particular group needs, leading to sub-optimal implementations ( Berente and Yoo, 2012 , Marshall et al., 2015 ) .
Outsourcing creates a reciprocal dependency between supplier and buyer and a power relationship comes into existence between them ( Emerson, 1962 , Kern and Kreijger, 2001 ) . From a structural perspective, resource dependency engenders a mutual power amongst supply chain partners ( Chicksand, 2015 . This level of dependency will be moderated by the complexity of outsourcing, the criticality of the resource, availability of alternatives as well as switching cost ( Caniëls and Roeleveld, 2009 , Cheon et al., 1995 ) . In essence, outsourcing is generally controlled by a commercial contract between the parties and the economic exchange is a contracted service delivery ( Emerson, 1987 ) , whilst power in such circumstances is operationalised by the client disciplining the vendor to comply with requirements or by the supplier controlling critical resources ( Heiskanen et al., 2008 ) . Moreover, clients and vendors have different objectives; vendors need to manage profit margin, long and short term, whilst the client is motivated by delivery performance and short term cost. This creates a tension when partnering behaviours are required during periods of uncertainty and the need for adaptability is confronted by inflexible and strong contracting ( Parker and Hartley, 2003 , Weber and Mayer, 2011 ) . This is further accentuated within a public sector context by the core ideologies of probity and equity and the need to manage cost that is often emphasised in fixed price contracts used to reduce risk and manage opportunism ( Sanderson, 2009 ) . These different perspectives are fundamentally conflictual and, consequently, implementation is a site of collaboration to create the service, and a site of conflict to claim value and deliver one's own objectives ( Heiskanen et al., 2008 ) .
The role of power in outsourcing contracts
Power is ubiquitous within the implementation stage of outsourcing and occurs in the control of 'deviancy' or delivery failure ( Quinn, 1980 ) , to co-opt groups in order to reduce conflict ( Pfeffer, 1993 ) , to manage culture and meaning ( Magelssen et al., 2015 , Schein, 1992 and as an embedded element of the supplier buyer delivery relationship ( Cox, 2001 ) . Power is used to influence behaviour, 'to change the course of events', to manage resistance and as discipline to 'get people to act differently' ( Li et al., 2014 , Pfeffer, 1992 .
Politics is an amalgam of the process, actions and the behaviours by which power is practically expressed and operationalised ( Horton, 2003 , Senior and Swailes, 2010 ) . 'Power, politics and culture … are intertwined in the outsourcing process' ( Allen et al., 2002: 170 ) .
Power dynamics shape all aspects of outsourcing's planning and execution from within the decision-making process, managing conflict between executives and IT managers ( Chakrabarty and Whitten, 2011 , Marshall et al., 2015 ) and controlling and disciplining the supplier if the service fails ( Heiskanen et al., 2008 ) . Furthermore, power is used to control supplier power and manage client dependency ( Caniëls and Roeleveld, 2009 , Stenbacka and Tombak, 2012 ) and to reduce the effects of conflict and resistance ( Pfeffer, 1981 , Pfeffer, 1993 . Power also arises in political and resisting behaviours, such as withholding or distorting information ( Pettigrew, 1973 ) , controlling the agenda ( Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992 ) managing decisions to 'side-line' potential opposition ( Chakrabarty and Whitten, 2011 ) or using inducements as a bargaining tool ( Hickson et al., 1986 , Marshall et al., 2015 .
The context and application of power directly effects collaborative behaviour and how suppliers adapt to the prevailing power context ( Cox, 2004 .
Structurally, the power dynamic has a material influence on how suppliers are managed and can restrict their zone of manoeuvre and their capability to react to changing business requirements. Strong contractual control from this perspective can 'stymy' collaborative behaviour, engender vigilant and instrumental behaviour, and prevent relational governance ( Sanderson, 2004 , Vanneste and Puranam, 2010 ) . This type of effect can be observed by poor adaptation to business change, cycles of negotiation in response to change as well as fragmented collaboration.
From the above discussion two research propositions will be explored:
How strong contracts can place constraints on supplier manoeuvrability in responding to business uncertainty and secondly, How a constrained project causes power and conflict to emerge as buyers and suppliers negotiate implementation.
We will conclude by proposing that appropriate governance and contracting needs to account for uncertainty in business requirements as well as the complexity of the delivered service.
Methods
The research was carried out between six collaborative buyer and supplier partners in the defence industry as they implemented a large-scale application development (HRMSys) for the headquarters HRM department, part of a large European multi-national defence organisation. The provision of the system was contracted by Agency to a buyer consortium led by a System Integrator (SI) that outsourced software development to a niche software house PersonSoft and the testing, validation and integration to a Romanian software testing company. The relationship between the collaborative partners and the extended supply chain that came into existence is shown as Figure 1 . The research not just based on episodic observations over time but on day-to-day observations in 'medias res' ( Van de Ven, 2007 ) .
This research adopts a practice perspective, studying the work of purposive actors solving everyday problems as they work together to implement the solution within the influence of power ( Currie and Swanson, 2009 , March, 1981 ) . This was an explanatory case study approach designed to describe and explain the complex phenomena of the implementation as it occurred within its real-life context ( Yin, 2011 ) . The research was a longitudinal, in depth case study ( Gummerson, 1991 , Yin, 1994 using participant observation as the field study approach ( Jorgensen, 1989 , Waddington, 2004 , including interviews and documentary analysis of contracts and substantial volumes of on-going e-mail traffic ( May, 2005 , Rowlinson, 2004 . Research data for the implementation phase included: semi-structured and structured interviews, documented workshops, research diaries, contract documentation, project management and control documents, internal memos and all monitoring reports. The case reported here was monitored for five years from contract bid and award until the delivery was accepted but focused on the implementation of the initial operating capability starting in 2011. This scope is shown in Figure 2 . The interview protocol during the implementation stage focused primarily on project interactions, problems and outcomes, post the initial operating capability (IOC). These interviews explored how the process had evolved over time, and in particular critical incidents. As a complete timeline was constructed we were able to triangulate and validate respondents' recall by referring to email exchanges, project and meeting reports. The number of personnel in the project across the six main organisations was sixty-one with twenty-one core participants who were tracked closely. The interviews during the implementation were carried out on location and varied in length between twenty minutes and two hours and were focused over time onto specific critical incidents (the initial and the follow up protocols are available on request). No recording of the interviews was permitted at the locations, due to high security requirements, and interviews were written up from hand-written notes immediately following each interview. This data was stored electronically in archive folders covering the general project control (13 folders, 535 files), design (12 folders, 675 files), emails (4,921) and memos/reports (1389). All data, including extracted emails, was entered to a password protected database, NVivo10. The data analysis steps were executed following IOC system acceptance during 2014. In addition, after IOC acceptance a round of semi-structured interviews was conducted during 2015 with key project participants structured around the main themes of power, conflict and contractual constraints and related points the analysis uncovered. These interviews lasted from one and a half to three hours, were recorded and transcribed then also loaded into NVivo10. The overall data collection model and interview structure for the implementation of HRMSys is shown as Figure 3 . 
Data Analysis
The framework for analysing the qualitative data extracted from the interviews, email narratives and documents followed the model described by Strauss and Corbin (1998) for grounded theory, and the data analysis was carried out in four main phases following the procedure outlined by Gioia et al. (2013 ) . First, field notes and project log, interview transcripts and archived project document data were thoroughly reviewed to get a broad understanding of the main project events and their sequence, which were then used as a guide for the initial coding. Analysis was based on identifying the themes of control and resistance observed at identified critical moments during project implementation using the theoretical lens of power in institutions as a sensitising framework ( Lawrence, 2008 ) . The first stage of analysis involved coding and classifying documentation, emails and interview transcripts chronologically, across organisations and participants to construct a complete timeline, in monthly segments, of the project from its initiation in February 2011 to final system acceptance in December 2013. In the second step we coded 'in vivo' for delivery service concepts and power themes based on the literature review and converged on the final model by a process of constant comparison, using framework matrices, iterating between the raw data with that encoded in the current construct.
Data representation
The derived empirical clusters, second-order theoretical constructs, and dimensions are shown in the data model Extensive process control inhibits supplier performance since it does not allow the supplier to show competence in managing service delivery ( Tiwana and Bush, 2007 ) . Tight and inflexible control quickly became an obstacle to progress, especially around the definition of the design. A fixed price project demands a known scope, whereas it was observed here the business requirements were far from fixed and required much more development, and this acted as an impediment to success ( Beaumont and Sohal, 2004 ) .
A fragmented supplier team was evident that exhibited poor knowledge sharing processes. Hong and Fiona (2009 ) showed that social inclusion is a prerequisite for joint development, and partners that remain largely distinct and distant cannot create a common identity and community of practice essential for a successful outcome. Accentuating this problem, declarative knowledge in documents is often insufficient and a high level of shared knowledge, especially deep tacit knowledge, is essential and this is only acquired by face-to-face interactions that were largely prevented. As was observed in this research a social process is essential and a separated non-integrated team impedes this ( Collins and Hitt, 2006 ) . The lack of integration and the strong control exerted by the buyers actively prevented the outsourcing team adapting to changing circumstances and added delays to the implementation. 
Dimension -creating a negotiated order
The exchange and bargaining for resources is a political process that creates a pattern of exchange that varies over time -the outcome representing the status of the power relations at a particular moment ( Dawson, 1994 ) . An extract of the data model is shown as Figure 6 and the empirical data trace to categories detailed in Table 2 . There was latent conflict at the heart of the project which was manifest in a mismatch between a niche supplier of bespoke software and a requirement for a commercial off the shelf (COTS) solution. From the beginning, how new requirements could be offset against existing functionality in the incumbent software application triggered negotiation. Agency and HRMDept insisted that new requirements should be included within the existing scope at no extra cost and suppliers disagreeing and stating new requirements were ' not included in the bid submission' and must be paid for. Furthermore, HRMDept claimed that there was ' substantive functionality already present' in the incumbent application that could be ' reasonably assumed' to be already delivered. This meant from their perspective that there was development time saved that could be offset against new requirements.
This process during the requirements and later stages revolved around this type of formal and informal negotiation, brokering and blaming, to reduce or contain scope.
Resistance was observed, and conflict emerged, as cycles of negotiation over failures in deliverables, blaming failures on partners, the settling of old scores, and conflict over the requesting and denial of help became a characteristic of the project. The strong contractual governance constrained adapting to change and suppliers responded to this by questioning and re-negotiating every element of the contact, which added to severe time delays. 
Influencing by exploiting relations The use of demonstrations and pre-releases was used as a process of achieving buy-in by PersonSoft
and an attempt to exploit past relationships. 
Exploiting relations 'I mentioned this to (name) a couple of weeks ago and he was OK with the principle of most effective use of Team time. I also mentioned it to (name) over lunch at the kick off. We should be able to make this work.' [Sales Manager PersonSoft] 'Informal communication on the development of the UCs is beneficial to the process and, hopefully, will reduce the continuing slippage of the activity dates in the schedule.' [HRMDept Manager]

Using informal contacts to bypass obstacles
Dimension -institutional and systemic power
Symbolic and Institutional power is embedded and acts to influence and constrain how organisations and actors perform their roles. Resistance as an action is mainly an attempt to reduce these constraints or to co-opt those elements in-line with one's own objectives. An extract of the data model shown is shown Figure 7 and the empirical data trace to categories detailed in Table 3 . Institutional constraints, via legitimate rules of engagement and established cultural norms of practice, regulated the work of the actors. It was observed that both suppliers and buyers were trying to modify and shape the contract to suit their own interests. Systemic power is an embedded factor within a project and represented by organisational scripts and patterns, and particular ways of talking and behaving, which becomes visible when constituted in actions of compliance. Symbolic tools, such as liquidated damages, were used for failings in contracted deliverables to control group behaviour and force compliance. There was an acceptance of authority hierarchies such as the contractor/subcontractor, client/supplier and defence/civilian dyads that legitimised authority relations, subordinate roles and particular organisational scripts.
Time and planning had a legitimate and unquestioned symbolic role within the system development. Meeting the schedule was of prime importance and the quality of what was delivered was secondary to when it was delivered. No one on the buyer side was able to assess for validity so deliverables were accepted on the basis of being on time. This exposed an information asymmetry between buyers and suppliers and was an example of shirking behaviour.
There were changes in the institutional context on a wider organisational scale, from a distributed to a more centralised form of governance that was reflected in the type of controls and standards being imposed on the organisation. Structural influences of wider economic and political forces, such as the global financial crisis in 2008, drove a tighter focus on cost that put at risk the original planning assumptions. Resistance to power was seen by the questioning of legitimacy and challenging of the worth of imposed rules and regulations, as well as nostalgia for the old ways of working. Changing norms of practice The less formal and loose working had to change to a formal approach and caused problems as this new way of working had to be learnt.
Structural Power
DefOrg (2007) 
Dimension -enforcing compliance to rules
Literature on power characterises compliance primarily as a direct application of the power of possession or control of resources. It is seen episodically as actors enforce systemic and symbolic power (Lawrence, 2008) . An extract of the data model is shown as Figure 8 and the empirical data trace to categories detailed in Table 5 . Agency and the HRMDept used their ability to reject, accept and veto deliverables as a mechanism for ensuring close compliance to the contractual imperatives. It was observed how obedience and compliance were ensured, by strictly controlling conformance to design rules or documentation standards, or by using sanctions and rewards. This was a direct use of power to control and influence the behaviour of the suppliers to be in line with that of the objectives of the dominant actor. Within this project, rejection of deliverables meant delays, extra work on repair and ultimately delays in payment for services which had a high impact on the suppliers. The negative aspects of this focus on compliance resulted in a lack of sensitivity to emerging problems in service delivery that only became apparent very late in the project. Resistance to the application of this type of power came through negotiation to reduce the scale and scope of functional deliverables, questioning the utility of key aspects, criticising requirements, claims of vagueness in business need, or reducing the impact of compliance by claiming inappropriateness. 
Discussion The Dynamics of Power
This research explores two propositions, firstly that strong contracts in an outsourcing prevent a flexible response to uncertainty, and secondly, in a constrained context a power dynamic emerges as buyers and suppliers conflict over implementation goals. The adoption of preventative, complex contracting, meant the practices of work were strongly regulated with an emphasis on monitoring and vigilance ( Barney and Hansen, 1994 , Malhotra and Murnighan, 2002 ) . This was observed in how meetings were structured to restate the project hierarchies in terms of the norms of behaviour, planning practices, the allowed topics and who was allowed to speak ( Fleming and Spicer, 2006 ) . The subordinated position of PersonSoft was emphasised and the flow of delivery and information between the parties actively managed. This observation emphasised two concrete aspects of how decision making was controlled, firstly, how decisions are taken in situations where there are conflicts of interest, and secondly, over the control of disputes, what topics could be discussed or even legitimately raised ( Hardy, 1996 , Horton, 2003 , Lukes, 1974 .
A derived model of the interaction between the four categories of power during the implementation is shown as Figure 9 . Central to this process were the practices that created the service outcome and the conflict that arose when there was a mismatch. This observation demonstrated how power and conflict arises from a form of disagreement on the outcomes and results in gap-closing actions ( Levina and Orlikowski, 2009 ) . Gaps also appeared within the internal dynamics of the group, when, for example, a process fault was noticed, such as during testing, or a requested action from a partner did not occur. Both of these aspects were observed during implementation and contributed incrementally to failure.
If there was no disagreement, or the situation was accepted, then limited conflict arose, however, where there was strong disagreement action was started via triggering of compliance or bargaining behaviours. The role of resistance in this process was to mediate and reduce the impact of the corrective actions when this was seen as detrimental by the parties. The nature of the gap in outcomes was framed by actors as either acceptable or something that must be corrected. Dependent on what was required an event was triggered as a change in requirements, governance or management actions. Whether or not a change actually took place depended on the event salience and whether there was sufficient power to overcome inertia. This feature helps explain why episodes of activity in this particular context were quasi-stable and did not adapt quickly. Although poor performance was becoming evident, mediations were dampened by effectively applied resistance and any corrective actions petered out.
The process of implementation of this outsourcing was subject to continuous iterative negotiation of scope and direction. In the intervening three years from contract award until actual start there were changes in business context and functional requirements that confronted a fixed immovable contract emphasising compliance to timelines and cost.
Over the implementation stage the failure to understand this changing context and translate this into achievable objectives continuously engendered conflict between the supplier and client organisations and underpinned eventual failure.
Bargaining behaviours developed in four main areas: managing capability shortfalls, containing scope, circumventing control, and negotiating a modification to plans and standards ( Barrett, 2004 ) . Capability gaps had emerged from the differences between deliveries in the contract, requirements, and those feasible within the current software application. The careful definition of the precise meaning of deliverables or persuasion to accept reduced capability as well as the removal of problematic functions to later were examples of negotiated compromises. These activities represented the application of influence to change the behaviour of buyers Hirschheim, 1993 , Pfeffer, 1981 ) .
This observation confirmed bargaining power as a forceful factor in framing the choices made during implementation ( Heiskanen et al., 2008 ) . In this situation suppliers acted opportunistically to maximise any impact of the change, with buyers endeavouring to minimise the effect on time and budget.
Resistance was expressed by negotiating relief from demands, appeals to prior relations, challenges to authority and relevance, and the subverting of formal hierarchies.
Resistance and cycles of negotiation and bargaining became endemic as gaps in expectations and deliveries appeared and poor communication and coordination emerged ( Vanpoucke and Veereke, 2010 ) . Furthermore, resistance in this context was seen as a response acting to control change to commercially acceptable levels and as such an integrated part of the action, evaluation and negotiation process. This supports the idea that resistance is not just 'restrictive' but active and purposive and can operate as a form of 'negative' feedback that potentially controls and avoids wide variability in project decisions ( Perren and Megginson, 1996 , Piderit, 2000 ) . what could be achieved ( Strauss, 1978 ) . The final state represented a balance between the parties and was an outcome of power and negotiation where resistance played an integral part in moderation.
Control and Action
The proposed relation between the control posture and service definition emerging from our research is shown as figure 10 . For simple, highly prescribed services that are relatively The observed behaviour in this case study demonstrates that power and conflict within an inter-firm relation are dynamic processes contingent on the scale and scope of the gap in performance and the relative power between the parties . Furthermore, it demonstrates that in real world implementations changes in scope, performance deficits, uncertainty and unplanned contingencies are daily facts of life. However unconstrained change and variability of business need can seriously impact success ( Beaumont and Sohal, 2004 ) . These continuous changes and problems can swamp planning practices founded on the 'iron three' of quality, cost and time and can make them ineffective ( Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006 , Pinto, 2010 ) .
Conclusion -the roots of project failure
This outsourcing event failed to meet any time, process or cost objectives as the strong governance mismatched the changed business circumstances that demanded a more collaborative inter-dependent mode of operation ( Sanderson, 2009 , Sanderson and Cox, each with their own internal objective and supporting its own organisational and individual group objectives ( Marshall et al., 2015 , Morgan, 1997 . These organisations were operating within the overall framework of an overarching goal as laid down in the contract. However, they also needed to achieve other objectives; such as cost reduction, service delivery and service profit margin. Changes in institutional context, relationships and hierarchies, objectives and outcome have been shown to engender conflict if the objectives of constituent organisations are compromised or contested ( Campbell, 2010 , Campbell, 2004 , Lindegaard, 2013 . Furthermore, a project environment displays systemic conflict throughout all its stages, a situation known to be associated with poor outcomes ( Verma, 1998 ) . Within this project high conflict emerged due to severe constraints in ability to deliver and a focus only on contractual demands that constrained supplier manoeuvrability to respond to change. This resulted in suppliers focusing only on instrumental goals and showing low flexibility in response to uncertainty.
The strong controls observed and the tight contracts focused on 'safeguarding' or 'prevention' increases the control over suppliers but reduces the opportunity for co-operation ( Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011 , Poppo and Zhou, 2013 ) . Furthermore, processes put in place to constrain and regulate supplier's behaviour to reduce risk, minimise supplier opportunism and ensure success are founded on a purely rational perspective. This notion of technological determinism implicit in current outsourcing practice ignores the effects of institutional and actor agency and the resistance actors can mobilise to modify implementation processes to suit their own interests. From this perspective outsourcing can be seen as an enacted process with parties able 'to escape' and resist contractual straightjackets leading to patterns of power and conflict during implementation that unfolds as different parties interact and negotiate. High levels of collaboration and interdependence can be argued as essential ingredients for managing shifting requirements within a complex service delivery , Sanderson, 2004 .
Within this outsourcing such collaboration was blocked by a strict contractual regime.
Implications for Practice
Emerging and growing problems in service delivery and an inability to adapt the implementation to major changes predicted the eventual poor outcome. The buyers approached this challenge by ever stronger project and contractual control, and a focus on the minutia of documents, rather than addressing evident problems in capability. From our observations, none of these compliance actions had any material effect on the eventual outcome and the use of sanctions may have actually inhibited openness and masked problems. Our research shows that outsourcing is a change where parties to the contract jointly create the service and must adapt their actions in response to contingencies.
Contracts are needed, inter alias, to control scope and manage opportunism but are subservient to the need to create effective service frameworks that are adaptive to the emergent nature of change in complex, inter-firm service contexts. 
Source: Authors
Consolidating our observations from the case we have demonstrated that in this project strong contractual governance, with a focus on ensuring compliance, in a situation of service uncertainty, constrained problem solving and led to sub-optimal outcomes that drove a process of continuous conflict and re-negotiation. Personsoft had worked collaboratively with the HRM department for many years developing tailor-made bespoke solutions for their business needs, (section C in figure 11 ). The formalisation of the HRM system meant both HRMDept and Personsoft had to operate within the formal guidance and control of a corporate organisation that emphasised strict contracting and compliance to objectives, (section B in figure 11 ). As the complexity of the requirements increased due to changing demands the organisations were constrained in their response and continued as if nothing had happened, emerging problems went unaddressed, and eventual failure secured.
Following project closure, and a formal review, attempts were made to position the full operating capability (FOC) phase more in the region A of figure six to reflect the developmental and integrated approach needed for the new technology. This points to two major lessons; firstly, contracts must be crafted appropriately to the service needed and complex uncertain business need requires inter-dependent collaborative approaches, secondly, if major changes are envisaged to a fixed price contract this will make the original contract invalid as it is almost impossible to adapt such a contractual regime to varying demand. This implies that when such change occurs it may be wise to start again and adopt a relational contracting approach.
